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CUSTOMS UNION CONCEPTS - REVIEW 
Purpo se/Obj ec tives 
The establishment of customs union (and other special tariff 
arrangements) between politically independent states are often seen as 
at least a partial solution for many of the economic and political 
problems encountered in international relationships. The usual line of 
argumentation is that the customs union creates a wider trading area, 
removes obstacles to competition within the union, makes possible a more 
economic allocation of resources, and thus operates to increase produc-
tion and raise planes of living. In addition, the customs union is 
considered to be conducive to the expansion of trade on a basis of multi-
lateralism and non-discrimination among partners. 
It is on the basis of such argumentation that sometimes the purpose 
of a customs union has been stated as essentially to permit (by virtue 
of a more extensive economic territory) a more developed division of 
labour better adapted to the existing natural and economic conditions, 
and consequently the potential to yield a more abundant and lower-cost 
production destined for the combined market. If this is so, then it 
may be expected that what would evolve is a greater degree of specializa-
tion, either because each country extends its production of those 
commodities for which it is better suited, or because within the same 
category of products the countries agree to specialize on specified 
types. 
The generalization that the larger economic area of the customs 
union is conducive to increasing the potential and scope for internal 
division of labour has also been linked with the view that the customs 
union is a movement to promote change in the international division of 
labour.— 
But there also is the other view of customs unions as mechanisms 
for making higher protection feasible and effective for limited areas 
1/ It should be noted that where this is an objective, the lower 
the rates of duty in the customs tariff, the less effect of this kind 
the customs union would have. 
going beyond the boundaries of single states, and promoting greater 
self-sufficiency for the larger area because self-sufficiency for single 
states was clearly impracticable or too costly. (It would of course, 
also follow that under customs union there would be a decrease in the 
degree of self-sufficiency of each member, to the extent that specializa-
tion develops, although there is an increase in the degree of self-
sufficiency of the customs union area as a whole.) 
While each of these propositions would be true in some measure 
they do not apply equally to different customs union. For this reason 
it is desirable and necessary to examine the particular case before one 
can arrive at judgements of what the consequences may be. 
Nature/Criteria 
The exercise mandated by the OECS Authority is that there should be 
a higher level of customs union operation within the framework of the 
2/ 
Eastern Caribbean Common Market.— Close reference to the detailed pro-
visions in the ECCM Agreement reveals that it contains many elements 
that in their operation would go beyond customs union. Nevertheless, 
the efficacy of those elements much depend on the effectiveness of the 
customs union operation. 
The traditional view was that a perfect customs union should meet 
three basic conditions: 
i) the complete elimination of tariffs as between the 
member territories; 
ii) the establishment of a uniform tariff on imports from 
outside the union; 
iii) apportionment of customs revenue between the members in 
accordance with an agreed formula. 
2/ According to the usually accepted definitions, in a common 
market the members proceed beyond the requirements of a customs union 
to eliminate restrictions among themselves on international movements 
of factors of production; while in ah economic union members proceed 
beyond the requirements of a common market, to unify their fiscal, 
monetary and socio-economic policies. 
From time to time further criteria have been stipulated in 
customs unions negotiations such as: 
a) foreign goods requiring only one and the same customs 
declaration; 
b) all goods entering from outside the union being 
subject to the same customs regulations; 
c) goods imported into the union paying only once the 
rates fixed by the tariff common to the countries 
forming the union. 
International law does not establish any definition of a complete 
customs union aside from what is stipulated in the General Agreement on 
3/ Tariffs and Trade (GATT).— There it is stated that -
"For the purpose of this Agreement: 
a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the sub-
stitution of a single customs territory for two or more 
customs territories9 so that 
i) duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce (except, where necessary, those per-
mitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV 
and XXX) are eliminated with respect to sub-
stantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories of the union or at least with respect 
to substantially all the trade in products origin-
ating in such territories, and 
ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 sub-
stantially the same duties and other regula-
tions of commerce are applied by each of the 
members of the union to the trade of territories 
not included in the union." 
What has become generally accepted as constituting the format 
for customs union operations centre around this range of characteristics 
but in practice there have been variations stemming from particular con-
cessions that the involved countries are prepared to make. 
3/ Article XXIVS Paragraph 8(a) of the GATT. 
Historically, customs unions that have been established reflect 
the features of having: uniformity of export and transit tariffs; free 
exchange of the products of the united countries; uniformity of the 
external import tariffs of the participating countries and suppression 
of intra-union tariffs; pooling of customs revenues and their apportion-
ment between the participating countries in accordance with a formula 
established in advance. However, there also have been cases where pro-
vision is made for the removal of tariffs between the members, and 
adoption of a common, tariff against imports from the outside - but leave 
intact (except as subsequently altered by mutual agreement) the whole 
machinery of import limitations, import licenses, special license dues 
and administrative fees. 
Tariffs 
Decisions in favour of customs unions often have a proviso that 
the common tariff should not be "higher" than the tariffs of the member 
countries prior to the union. In fact this provision in the GATT is 
stated in the terms that the duties and other regulations on trade 
"shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general 
incidence of the duties and regulations of trade applicable in the 
constituent territories prior to the formation of such union." To 
satisfy this requirement a commonly used approach is to average the 
national rates for each commodity group, so that some partners move up 
and others move down to arrive at the common rate. 
It might, however, be immediately observed that, even if the new 
tariff is made up of the lowest rates previously levied by any of the 
member countries on each class of imports, the common tariff may still 
be more restrictive in fact, than the previous tariffs, because customs 
unions operate to convert revenue duties to protective duties. For 
this reason, it is often assumed that in a customs union the purpose of 
the tariffs is protection, not revenue; and that either a tariff will 
be high enough to bring domestic production into being, or it will not 
be imposed at all. 
It is not easy to distinguish sharply between revenue duties and 
protective duties. On the one hand, protective duties are those which 
operate to reduce imports, not only by making commodities of the specific 
kind involved more expensive to potential customers (and so lessening 
their consumption) but also, and chiefly by diverting consumption from 
imported commodities to the products of corresponding domestic industries. 
On the other hand, revenue duties may be regarded as those duties 
productive of revenue which do not act. as effective stimulus to the 
domestic production of commodities similar to those paying the duties. 
Even such duties, however, operate to increase the proportion of 
aggregate domestic consumption which is directed towards domestically 
produced commodities. 
The substantial difference then between revenue duties and 
protective duties is that revenue duties have only a generalised 
protective effect, whereas protective duties have both this generalised 
effect and a special effect in stimulating the domestic production of 
commodities similar to those subject to the protective duty, (with the 
consequence that protective duties tend to be more effective than 
revenue duties as restraints on importation). 
Allocation of Customs Revenues 
Whenever customs revenues are very important the method of their 
allocation between the members of a customs union is likely to be a major 
issue. Generally, the greater the disparity in economic levels between 
the members, and the greater the differences as between the members in the 
normal consumption of imported commodities, the greater is likely to be the 
difficulty in finding a formula for allocation of customs receipts, which 
can be mutually acceptable. 
Different approaches have been adopted in the past but none have 
been without problems. In the Zollverein, the simplest possible formula 
of allocation,which is, allocation according to population, was found to be 
* Customs union of the German states in the nineteenth century. 
generally practicable; but modification was necessary in at least two instances -
in respect of members with relatively high per capita income levels, and in 
respect of members with specially important external trade relations. 
In customs unions in which British Colonies have participated, (as well 
as in some other customs unions), allocation was in general according to the 
place of consumption of the dutiable goods. However, this formula could be 
difficult to apply either where imported raw materials are processed in one 
member territory for sale in another, or where wholesale distribution was 
concentrated in one territory. 
Although allocation according to consumption has been the more favoured 
approach, customs unions that embrace contiguous countries still found it 
necessary to allocate a fraction of the receipts as compensation for 
administrative expenses to the territory or territories in which the import 
duties were actually collected. In some cases agreed percentages were applied, 
and in others lump sum per.annum allocations were made. 
The crux of the problem, however, is that when a common tariff is in 
operation, the question of transfer of customs receipts will arise mainly in 
the case where an importer enters goods for customs which will subsequently 
be sent on to another territory within the union. This is more so the case 
where the union countries are contiguous and customs boundaries between them 
are eliminated and also customs services. 
Customs Administration 
It is found desirable in some cases to merge in some degree or fashion 
the customs administration staffs of the participating countries. This comes 
not only from seeking greater administrative economies, but also from the 
fact that when the tariff wall is removed between countries, each is likely to 
acquire an active concern in the character and standards of customs administration 
in the other territories. If the countries are of comparable importance, this 
concern is greater depending on the extent of their differing economic interests 
and conditions, and differences in loyalties (as between sectors) in each territory. 
Several degrees of merger of customs services have been distinguished: 
(1) Complete absorption by a dominant member of the 
responsibility for enforcement of the customs 
laws and regulations; 
(2) A merged central customs and administrative staff 
responsible to the customs union as a whole (and 
not to particular members); 
(3) Active participation by officers of more efficient 
members in the administration of the customs of 
other members; 
(4) Mutual supervision; 
(5) Complete autonomy cf administration with reliance 
upon mutual integrity and submission to arbitration 
in case of disputes. 
In this regard it should be noted that the greater the extent of 
unification in the customs services,the more important becomes the 
question of executive control of the customs administration. 
Allocation of Authority 
Aside from the day to day administration of customs, there still 
remain questions concerning the allocation of authority with respect 
to changes in tariffs, changes in customs codes, and the conduct cf 
negotiations with outside countries on tariff matters. 
There is the possibility of adopting terms of equality in tariff 
legislation and administration. By these arrangements changes in the 
tariff could be made only by mutual consent, and customs administration 
remains in the charge of the different states, subject only to an agreed 
common administrative code. In such situation, policy is decided by 
standard diplomatic procedures, all the members having equal status, 
and unanimity is required to institute tariff or administrative changes, 
and to negotiate effectively with non-member states. 
There is also the possibility of the sovereign states comprising 
the customs union establishing a customs council which reaches 
decisions binding on all by majority vote. In this situation customs 
inspectors, instead of being local civil servants, become officers 
answerable to the council. And through the council negotiations are 
conducted with third countries, and commercial treaties concluded. 
This latter aspect is in some cases circumscribed where individual 
members are anxious to ensure for themselves greater freedom of action 
in negotiating commercial treaties with third countries. 
Other features may be that the customs laws and administration should be 
"assimilated"» with permanent conferences established to supervise the 
application of the tariff and of the customs regulations. But problems which 
cannot be left unsolved include: 
(a) harmony of relations with/against third countries; 
(b) procedures for tariff revision; 
(c) allocation of revenues from import duties collected in 
one country on goods destined for a partner. 
Inhibiting Factors 
Whether or to what extent intended objectives are realised depends on a 
range of circumstances, some of which could inhibit the customs union operation. 
For example, a significant economic consequence of a customs union is to make 
a country's territory an additional field of operation for the tariff protection 
of its partners" industries. This assumes some action for really opening the 
internal market in each country to competition from lower cost industries in 
partner countries. But if there is aversion to opening of markets to the 
competition from each other's industries, there will not be progress toward 
specialisation, divisioh of labour and such derived economies as may have been 
envisaged„ 
Perhaps an even more central factor is the extent to which the yield from 
taxes on trade constitutes a high proportion of total revenue. If a customs 
union is established between countries which before had only revenue duties, 
and if all the duties levied by the customs union continue to operate as 
"revenue duties", an appraisal of the customs union would turn chiefly on its 
administrative economies, or conveniences, or on political aspects. 
There are situations where economic factors are not on the whole such as 
to make specially close commercial ties between neighbouring countries genuinely 
attractive. They may be typically rival exporters of the same staple 
commodities; and also they may be poor sources of supply for the goods in most 
urgent demand from abroad. Further, the existence of price controls, subsidies, 
etc., make it extremely difficult if not impossible to completely remove trade 
barriers, unless the process is carried beyond the customs union stage. In 
addition, where there is heavy dependence on indirect taxation as a source for 
government revenue, a good deal of the possible administrative economy 
of customs union is likely to be lost, if the establishment of uniformity 
of such taxes did not accompany formation of the customs union. 
In some cases, there is not the possibility to create a full customs 
union, because it would involve the establishment of special institutions 
to perform functions that individual member countries do not have the 
capacity to undertake on continuing basis. Invariably this involves not 
only an additional money-cost but s I p o the surrender of some sovereignty 
in legislative matters, which the countries may not be willing to concede. 
It is against the background of this range of concepts that, the ECCM 
customs union operations is being considered. 
THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN COMMON MARKET (ECCM) 
Situation 
The framework for customs union operations determined by the ECCM 
Agreement approximates to the two main traditionally accepted criteria 
applying to customs unions, but is silent on some of the other 
traditionally accepted concepts and attributes. From the outset the ECCM 
arrangements required the abolition of import duties on goods consigned 
from one member state to another, which were deemed eligible for market 
area tariff treatment. Paraielled with this was the decision to establish 
a common customs tariff on goods originating in non-member territories 
and countries. 
There were however no stipulations concerning the apportionment of 
customs revenues between the members on the basis of some agreed formula. 
Neither were there requirements for having the same customs regulations, 
or the use of one and the same customs declaration, or goods imported 
from outside paying only once the rates fixed by the common tariff. 
Intra-ECCM Trade 
The stipulations concerning intra-ECCM trade defined import duties 
so as to include any tax or surtax of customs, and in addition any other 
charges of equivalent effect - whether fiscal, monetary or exchange -
which are levied on imports. Further non-application of import duties 
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in intra-ECCM trade was emphasised by the specific indication that this would also 
be the case for goods not produced in the Importing country, and that the treatment 
of such products would be on the basis of non-discrimination among sources as regards 
3/ any internal charges that may apply.— 1 
In treating the effect of revenue duties and internal taxation on goods imported 
from partners, the provision expressly forbids the application of any fiscal charges 
in excess of what applies to like domestically produced goods. And the point is made 
too that no charges should be so applied as to afford effective protection to like 
domestic goods, whether directly or indirectly. Additionally, members are forbidden 
to apply fiscal charges to goods imported from partners which the importing country 
does not itself produce, in such a way as to afford effective protection to the 
4/ domestic production of substitute goods.— 
The provisions therefore sought to achieve: 
(i) Easy movement within the ECCM of goods of area origin; 
free of trade duties and charges whether applied directly or indirectly; 
(ii). Equality of treatment for partners' products on the same 
basis as that accorded to domestic products; 
( i i i ) Access to the domestic markets of the member countries, of 
goods produced in partner countries, under conditions where no protection is 
accorded to domestic producers of like goods or of substitutes. 
These goods moving within the ECCM area, however had to conform to one 
of the following conditions: (that they) 
(a) are wholly produced within the market area; 
(b) fall within a description of goods listed in a 
process list; 
(c) contain materials imported from outside the ECCM 
that do not exceed sixty percent of the export price. 
3/ ECCM Agreement article 5 paragraph 3. 
4/ ECCM Agreement article 8. 
In addition, these origin rules provide that seventy-three items 
which constitute the Basic Materials List, attached as schedule to the 
ECCM Agreement, would be regarded as originating wholly within the 
Eastern Caribbean Common Market. 
.Extra-ECCM Trade 
In respect of trade with countries outside the ECCM, article 7 of 
the Agreement provided for the establishment of a common customs tariff. 
No criteria was set in the Agreement for determination of the common 
tariffs, how it should be brought into effect, or how it should be 
administered. It is therefore worthwhile to recall that at the time of 
establishing the rates of duties for the ECCM common external tariff, 
although some difficulties arose from the existence of various 
preferential obligations, the prime consideration was to set up a tariff 
in conformity with the economic, developmental and financial interest of 
the countries in the ECCM group. 
Although the ECCM territories were not bound in the free selection 
of duties for the common tariff, in the sense that they could make them 
higher if they so wished, in the absence of a better system the approach 
adopted was based on the arithmetical average of the then country rates, 
as far as was logically justifiable. In the process, practically all raw 
materials and social goods were made duty free; and for machinery and other 
production goods very little (if any) duties were provided. In addition 
the transitional arrangement, was built into the common tariff that for some 
items special (national) duties would be retained to be gradually adjusted 
towards a common rate. 
In the several areas in which the ECCM Agreement is silent the 
countries retained their individual treatment of extra ECCM trade relations, 
particularly in the application of charges having equivalent effect to 
customs duties, and also in the regulation and administration of trade. 
In such matters there is not uniformity throughout the ECCM area. 
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As regards the supplementary charges on Imports, aside from consumption taxes 
which are applied by every one of the ECCM territories,—'' there are a range of 
taxes, duties and charges, the most popular of which are stamp taxes, stamp duties 
and package tax. Each territory legislates its own rate, presumably for revenue 
purposes. Account also has to be taken of the customs surcharges and surtaxes that 
have been applied to imports from time to time by some of the countries - in addition 
to the common tariff. 
Concerning the regulation and administration of trade, each of the territories 
maintain a set of prohibitions, licensing, permits and special certifications. 
The groups of commodities to which they apply varies from territory to territory as 
do the specifics of the regulatory devices. 
Allocation of Customs Revenues 
The question of allocation of customs revenues was broached at least once in 
the early negotiations of the ECCM Agreement, but it did not become a subject of 
debate. Accordingly, there are no provisions within the ECCM for allocation of 
customs revenues; and there seems little present concern to consider it as an issue. 
The rationale for this situation stems largely from the fact that the ECCM 
territories are not contiguous, and as such each and every one had to retain defined 
customs boundaries and operations. Further in each territory the bulk of imports 
have been for consumption within the territory, and not for transmission to some 
other destination territory within the ECCM area. It follows that "allocation of 
customs revenues according to place of consumption" is largely met by the logic of 
the situation, each territory retaining the collected customs revenues and defraying 
its own customs administration expenses. 
There are however circumstances in which the allocation of customs revenues 
could become a matter for consideration among the ECCM territories. If the 
mechanisms for integration approach the point of operating a unified customs service, 
or/and if centralization of bulk purchasing of imports is adopted, or/and if 
importation for processing and shipment to other partners should develop in a 
polarised manner, there would need to be some adjustment to achieve a more equitable 
allocation of benefits among the countries. 
5/ Consumption taxes were adopted by the individual territories to offset 
the revenue lost through application of the common external tariff. 
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Othar Conceptual Aspects 
There are no provisions in the ECCM Agreement corresponding to the 
concepts that foreign goods entering the ECCM area would (a) require only 
one and the same customs declaration and (b) pay only once the rates 
fixed by the common tariff. In practice these concepts are met wholly or 
largely by the regulations governing re-exports of goods, which are 
normally treated differently from retained imports. Invariably the 
arrangements are that re-exports are held in bond for onward transmission 
to the destination country, with customs duty paid at the destination» 
Regarding the allocation of authority in customs matters, as already 
mentioned, each territory retains full administration of customs and 
legislative authority over those aspects on which the ECCM Agreement is 
silent. With regard to those matters provided in the Agreement, the 
Council of Ministers now superseded by the Economic Affairs Committee of 
the OECS as the principal organ of the common market, makes the decisions 
concerning intra-ECCM and extra-ECCM trade , There is no customs council 
as such, the common market policy and legislation including changes in 
the common tariff being arrived at by standard diplomatic procedures, 
requiring unanimity, all the members having equal status. 
6 / Customs Union Operations— 
In implementing the provisions of the ECCM Agreement, import duties 
between the member territories were eliminated from the inception of the 
6/ In treating the external trade of the OECS countries it is of 
importance to remember that each ECCM member country is also a member of 
the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) which in addition to the OECS 
countries include Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago. 
In accordance with the area of origin criteria of CARICOM, OECS trade 
with those countries is also carried out free of import duties subject to 
the exceptions contained in Schedules III and IV of the Chaguaramas Treaty. 
The rates of duty applied to such goods qualifying under the area origin 
criteria of CARICOM are established by legislation in each ECCM member state. 
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ECCM,—'' and in 1972 a common external tariff came into effect. In its first 
formulation the ECCM common external tariff was a two column tariff with general 
and preferential rates ; but this was changed to a single column tariff in 1976 
to conform with the EEC/ACP relationships that emerged under the Lome II Convention. 
Subsequently, in 1979 the common tariff was updated to achieve a wider coverage of 
items» For a l imited number of items individual ECCM countries were granted the 
r ight f o r a l imited period, to apply special duty rates instead of the common ECCM 
rata . These special rates have been altered from time to time in the direction of 
the coicmon rates s and the number of items at tract ing special rates have been 
gradually reduced. 
Consistent with the application of a common tariff, the OECS countries 
observe a common set of principles for the interpretation of the tariff. These 
rules for interpretation are deemed to be an integral part of the tariff, and are 
set out in the notes that precede the schedule of rates of import duties. 
In addition the common external tariff incorporates a List of Conditional 
Duty Exemptions and Reductions. This list contains the cases in which the 
governments of the ECCM countries may admit goods which are dutiable in the customs 
tariff„ either duty-free or at a duty rate lower than the rates provided for in the 
common tariff- The goods granted such treatment need to be imported under the 
conditions specified in the list, which indicates the uses that would justify the 
special treatment. 
All decisions concerning the granting of these exemptions and reductions fall 
within the exclusive competence of the individual governments, who are free to 
refuse the exemption, should they so decide. An important qualification is that the 
ECCM countries should withhold those benefits from goods or articles which are 
obtainable at comparable cost from a manufacturer in the ECCM area. It should be 
noted that the frame adopted for administering the common tariff does not include an 
agreed common administrative code, beyond the principles for interpretation of the 
tariff, and the List of conditional duty exemptions and reductions from the common tariff. 
! 
If one takes the view that the purpose of the common tariff is protection, and 
that either a tariff rate will be high enough to bring domestic production into being, 
or it will not be imposed at all, then the efficiency of the common tariff becomes an 
U The ECCM Agreement was signed at Grenada, 11 June 1968, and came into force 
15 July 1968» 
important consideration. As far as can be ascertained, there has not 
up rc aow been a concerted effort to assess the ECCM common external 
tariff in these terms. It is therefore far from clear the extent to 
which cha common tariff acts as a protective mechanism as against its 
operation as a revenue producer. 
In shorts the common external tariff (together with the principles 
for its interpretation and the list of conditional duty exemptions and 
reductions), presently constitute the main component of the customs 
union operations. All the other elements are at varying degrees of 
standardization and are administered individually by the member 
territories. However it should be noted that the ECCM Agreement 
provisions go much beyond purely customs union operation considerations. 
Beyond Customs Union 
Taken together the ECCM provisions can conveniently be looked at in 
terms of those that directly affect trade, and those that are intended 
to facilitate the production processes. While on the trade side the 
primary concern is the liberalization of movement of goods and creation 
of equal conditions for the products of all the participants in the ECCM, 
on the production side the provisions are geared towards greater ireedom 
of movement of capital and labeur. 
Three situations obtain in the provisions relating to freeing the 
movement of these production factors, which can be classified according to 
(i) where area conditions would immediately apply; 
(ii) where a common policy was to be established at a point in time; 
(iii) where there would be continuing review to achieve a high 
measure of harmonization. 
Article 13(5) of the Agreement explicitly removes obstacles to move-
ment of capital belonging to persons resident in the ECCM area. And 
Articles 13(6), 16 and 17 stipulate the adoption of common policies on 
fcraigr* capital, agriculture and transport, while Article 12 seeks a 
phssed removal cf obstacles to the free movement of persons. In addition 
ths ¿gisement has previsions for the review and progressive harmonization 
cf monetary, and fiscal, ar.d development policies; and sets out explicitly 
fcha objectives tor a common industrial policy. 
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By providing for increasing inter-country mobility of the factors of production, 
capital and.labour, the customs union operations are set in a context that go much 
beyond the concepts of customs union per se, where the adjustments (and benefits) are 
saeanfc to be derived from trade and changes in the levels of output within and among 
the partner countries. (In fact it can be argued that the limit to gains from 
industrial production in a customs union is set by the degree of mobility enjoyed 
by the factors of production). 
SumaiingJUjs 
The conceptual frame of the 2COM customs union operations is one where provision 
has been made for the removal of tariffs among the members, and adoption of a common 
tariff against imports from the outside, but leave intact the individual national 
mechanisms on import limitations, import licenses, special license dues and 
administrative fees. Accordingly, each territory retained complete autonomy of 
customs administration, with reliance upon mutual integrity concerning the character 
and standards in the administration of customs. Consistent with this each territory 
retains the collected customs revenues, defraying its own customs administration 
expenses - with no provision for any re-aliccations. 
With each territory retaining full legislative and administrative authority, 
policy affeetiag customs union operations is decided by standard diplomatic 
procedures, all the members having equal status. As a consequence, unanimity is 
required to institute changes in the common external tariff and in its administration, 
also in such matters as negotiating with non-member states on aspects that are 
approached collectively. At the same time, however, most areas of relationships with 
third countries are administered by the individual territories, thus retaining freedom 
of action for bilateral negotiation of commercial treaties with third countries. 
It follows that aside from the implementational aspects of the common tariff, 
there are several non-tariff aspects that should be streamlined, if fuller customs 
union operation is to be achieved. These areas where greater uniformity would 
8 / improve the customs union operation would include:— 
8/ These aspects have been dealt with in separate papers. 
- changes having equivalent effect to customs duties; 
- the regulation of trade i.e. prohibitions, licensing, permits 
and special, certifications affecting imports; 
- administration of customs (particularly customs procedures and 
documentation). 
Clearly the highest level of uniformity in the non-tariff aspects, 
and the greater the implementation of measures bringing standardization 
into third country relations; the higher the level of efficiency in the 
administration of the customs union that can be achieved » 
The further question of the possibility of greater centralization 
in the administration of customs and in the customs authority, will very 
much depend on the extent to which the member countries are prepared to 
introduce modifications to the conceptual frame adopted in the ECCM 
agreement. 

